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This paper studies a bargaining model in which the seller is uncertain about which distri-
bution the buyer’s values are drawn from. The distribution of the buyer’s values is ﬁxed across
periods, while the buyer’s values are drawn independently from the distribution each period. In
the classical model of repeated bargaining where the buyer’s value is drawn from a commonly
known distribution and ﬁxed across periods, the high-value buyer has a strong incentive to
conceal his value, and the seller loses most of her bargaining power. An important question
is whether adding a layer of uncertainty makes the high-value buyer more willing to accept
high-price oﬀers and improves the seller’s revenue. We ﬁnd this to be the case as long as the
seller’s ex ante beliefs are suﬃciently optimistic.
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One important question in the literature of repeated bargaining is how players’ private information
is revealed over time, and related to that, how economic surplus is distributed between the bar-
gaining parties. In order to examine these questions, we focus on a framework commonly used in
the previous literature: a buyer (denoted as he) and a seller (denoted as she) bargain over multiple
periods, with the buyer having private information; in each period, the seller proposes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer and the buyer decides whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. In the classical models
a common assumption is that the buyer’s private information is his value, which is ﬁxed across
periods, and the distribution of the buyer’s value is common knowledge. Under this assumption,
the seller has a large disadvantage and loses most of her monopoly power. This stark result is
established in both cases when the seller sells or rents a durable good.
The literature on the Coase conjecture ﬁnds that if the durable-good monopolist sells over time
and can quickly lower prices, the seller can hardly achieve proﬁts greater than the lowest buyer
valuation and the buyer obtains the entire surplus from trade in excess of his lowest valuation
(Coase 1972, Fudenberg et al. 1985).1 When the monopolist bargains over renting the durable
good to a buyer with private value, Hart and Tirole (1988) show that the seller always oﬀers a low
price until the end of the game if the horizon is long enough.2 Intuitively, when the time horizon
is long, the high-value buyer type will not accept any price rejected by the low-value buyer type,
in order to avoid being charged with a high price in all later periods. So the seller is not able
to price discriminate and she charges a low price to both low-value and high-value types, until
close to the end of the horizon. Therefore, if the durable-good monopolist rents the durable good,
the seller is again caught in an unfavorable position. Notice that in Hart and Tirole the buyer is
non-anonymous,3 that is, the seller is able to identify the buyer’s previous action, and consequently
the buyer is concerned with how his action today will aﬀect his payoﬀ tomorrow. When the buyer’s
value is ﬁxed, revealing the current value means revealing all the private information on future
values, so the high-value type has a strong incentive to hide his value.
In this paper, we examine a two-period rental model (equivalent to the case that a seller repeat-
edly charges to sell a perishable good or provide service to a buyer) where the buyer has private
information not only about his valuation when each period comes about but also about the dis-
tribution from which his values are drawn. Our model is diﬀerent from Hart and Tirole’s rental
model in two ways. First, we introduce an additional layer of uncertainty on the buyer’s value
1This result holds under the assumption that the seller’s marginal cost is lower than the buyer’s lowest value,
which is called the “gap” case in the literature. Failures of the Coase conjecture are found when the lowest buyer
valuation does not exceed the seller’s cost, which is referred as the “no-gap” case in the literature (Gul et al. 1986,
Ausubel and Deneckere 1989).
2Hart and Tirole (1988) examine the sale model and the rental model in three cases: (1) where the parties can
commit themselves to a contract once and for all; (2) where the parties can only write short-term contracts which rule
within a period, but cannot commit themselves between periods; (3) where parties can write a long-term contract
which rules across periods, but cannot commit themselves not to renegotiate this contract by mutual agreement. The
rental model without commitment as in this paper is part of the analysis in Hart and Tirole.
3Bulow (1982) argues that the durable-good monopolist may be better oﬀ when renting the durable good rather
than selling it, if the buyer is anonymous.
1distribution. The distribution may be either good or bad. Both distributions can draw high value
or low value, with the good distribution generating a high value with a higher probability. The
buyer privately observes the distribution at the beginning of the game. But the seller only knows
the ex ante probability of the two distributions. Second, the buyer’s value is drawn from one of
the two distributions independently across periods at the beginning of each period. Since the seller
does not know which distribution the buyer’s values are drawn from, the buyer’s value is correlated
across time periods from the seller’s perspective.
The purpose of the paper is to ask whether the seller can improve her standing by introducing
this second layer of uncertainty about the distribution of the buyer’s values. On one hand, our
model maintains the buyer’s strategic considerations across periods, which makes the problem still
interesting and close to many real life examples where the bargaining parties are involved in a
long-term relationship. On the other hand, we are able to examine whether allowing the buyer’s
value to be redrawn provides a leeway to solve the problem of the durable-good monopolist, without
assuming the buyer is anonymous.
The assumption that the buyer’s value distribution is uncertain can be illustrated in the follow-
ing example. Imagine that a construction company rents big machines from a monopolist every time
when a new project begins. The value of using the machines depends on the quality of the project,
which depends on both the construction company’s technology and some random eﬀects. The
construction company may have a superior technology or an inferior technology, and the superior
technology may generate a project of high quality with a higher probability. Both the technology
and the quality of the project are the construction company’s private information.
The main result we ﬁnd is that the seller is indeed better oﬀ when she has suﬃciently optimistic
ex ante beliefs about the favorable distribution, compared to a two-period version of Hart and
Tirole’ (1988) model with the same ex ante probability of a high-value buyer type. The unique
equilibrium outcome is for the seller to oﬀer a high price and for the buyer type with a high value
to accept the oﬀer in each period. When the seller has a moderate ex ante belief, the buyer does
not always truthfully reveal his value, mixed strategy is involved and there exist multiple equilibria.
The seller’s revenue, however, can still be higher than that in Hart and Tirole (1988). Suﬃcient
conditions for the seller to be better oﬀ are provided.
Two other papers also examine a rental model in which a non-anonymous buyer’s value randomly
changes over time.4 Kennan (2001) analyzes inﬁnitely repeated contract negotiations where the
buyer has persistent (but not permanent) private information. The buyer’s value is assumed to
change according to a two-state Markov chain. Kennan (2001) focuses on the cyclic screening
equilibria in which several pooling oﬀers in sequence make the seller more and more optimistic and
the seller makes an aggressive screening oﬀer eventually.
4Several other papers also allow the buyer’s valuations to vary over time. Sobel (1991) shows that when there is
a constant ﬂow of new buyers, a Folk theorem holds in a sale model. Blume (1990) examines a sale model where
the low buyer type’s value varies over time and the high buyer type’s value stays ﬁxed and demonstrates that both
uniqueness and Coase conjecture may fail to hold. Blume (1998) and Battaglini (2005) study long-term contracting.
Biehl (2001) analyzes a durable-goods model with anonymous buyers. Lemke (2004) presents a dynamic bargaining
model in which actions in the last period aﬀect the buyer’s expected future value.
2Loginova and Taylor (2008) investigate a two-period model where the monopolist employs price
experimentations to learn the permanent demand parameter of the buyer. Although we have
beneﬁted a lot from reading their paper, the two papers were developed independently and diﬀer in
several aspects. First, Loginova and Taylor (2008) assume that the value distribution is represented
by λ, which is a continuous random variable distributed on [0,1]. In this paper, we assume that the
value distribution may either be favorable or unfavorable. Second, our major concern is whether
introducing the additional layer of uncertainty on the buyer’s value distribution can improve the
seller’s revenue, and if so, under what condition. We keep our model simple so that we can
completely characterize the equilibria and compare the seller’s revenue with that in Hart and
Tirole (1988), in which the buyer’s value distribution is common knowledge. Finally, Loginova
and Taylor (2008) assume that there is no discounting, which makes some results diﬀerent from
ours. For instance, they ﬁnd that when all the low-value types accept an oﬀer less than the low
value, the seller never oﬀers a ﬁrst-period price that yields her valuable information about the
buyer’s permanent demand parament λ. In our model, the seller oﬀers a price that yields valuable
information if the discount rate is low enough or the seller’s prior is high enough.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
presents some intermediate results. Section 4 presents the set of equilibria. Section 5 compares the
seller’s revenue in this model with that in Hart and Tirole (1988). Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are in Appendix A. Appendix B provides discussion on equilibrium concept.
2 The Model
One buyer and one seller bargain over renting a durable good in two periods t = 1,2. The seller’s
cost is assumed to be 0. The buyer has a positive value, vt, in consuming the good in each period
t. The buyer’s value vt is drawn from one of two distributions in each period: the bad distribution
B or the good distribution G. For a given distribution d, vt equals h with probability qd and
equals l with probability 1 − qd. Assume that 0 < qB < qG < 1 and 0 < l < h, i.e., the good
distribution G has a higher probability of generating a high value h. The buyer knows which one
of the two distributions his values are actually drawn from as well as his current and former values.
However, the seller only knows that the buyer’s value is drawn each period from one of these two
distributions. The ex ante probability is α for the G distribution and 1−α for the B distribution.
At the beginning of the game, the buyer privately observes the realization of distribution d,
which will be ﬁxed throughout the game. At the beginning of each period t, the buyer’s valuation vt
is drawn from the realized distribution independently across time periods. After the buyer privately
observes vt, the seller oﬀers a price pt ∈ R, and then the buyer chooses an action at ∈ {0,1}, where
at = 1 means acceptance and at = 0 means rejection.
Both the seller and the buyer are assumed to be risk-neutral. If the buyer accepts the seller’s
oﬀer in period t, the buyer’s payoﬀ is vt − pt and the seller’s payoﬀ is pt in period t. They both
gain nothing in period t if pt is rejected. The two players share a common discount factor δ, and
both of them maximize the discounted present value of expected payoﬀs.
3Let θ1 = (d,v1) denote as the buyer’s type in period 1 and θ2 = (d,v1,v2) as the buyer’s type in
period 2. Since we will focus on the buyer’s ﬁrst period behavior later, it is helpful to notice that
there are four buyer types in period 1: (G,l), (B,l), (G,h), and (B,h). Denote hs
t as the history
observed by the seller before she announces pt and hb
t as the history observed by the buyer before he
chooses at. Speciﬁcally, hs
1 = ∅, hb
1 = (θ1,p1), hs
2 = (p1,a1) and hb
2 = (θ2,p1,a1,p2). A behavioral
strategy for the seller, σs, assigns probability (or density) σs(pt | hs
t) to pt given any history hs
t for
t = 1,2. A behavioral strategy for the buyer, σb, assigns probability σb(at | hb
t) to at given any
history hb
t for t = 1,2. For convenience, let σb(hb
t) ≡ σb(at = 1 | hb
t) denote the probability that
the buyer accepts pt given history hb
t, since the buyer can only choose to accept or reject an oﬀer.
Finally, let γ(hs
t) denote the probability that the seller’s belief assigns to the G distribution at the
beginning of period t given history hs
t. Notice that γ(p1,0) and γ(p1,1) denote the seller’s belief of
d = G given that p1 is rejected and accepted respectively.
The equilibrium concept used is strong Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.5 Bayes’ rule is used to
update the seller’s belief conditional on reaching any price p1, even if p1 is oﬀ the equilibrium path.
We also employ a reﬁnement which is a variant of criterion D1 in the signalling game (Cho and
Kreps 1987, Banks and Sobel 1987). In Appendix B, we formally deﬁne criterion D1.
3 Preliminary Results
3.1 The Second-Period Equilibrium Strategies
We start the analysis from the second (last) period. Similar as in the previous literature, the
equilibrium strategies in the last period are simple: the buyer accepts p2 if and only if p2 does not
exceed v2; the seller either oﬀers p2 = l or p2 = h, depending on whether her belief of v2 = h is less
or greater than the cutoﬀ belief l/h. Given the seller’s belief of d = G is γ, her belief of v2 = h is
qGγ +qB(1−γ), so she oﬀers p2 = l (p2 = h) if her belief of d = G is less (greater) than γ∗, where
γ∗ satisﬁes the equation qGγ∗ + qB(1 − γ∗) = l/h. Lemma 1 formally states the discussion above,
in which x(hs
2) denotes the probability that the seller oﬀers p2 = l following history hs
2. In order to
make the problem interesting, we assume qB < l/h < qG throughout the paper.6






if p2 ≤ v2;
if p2 > v2,










∈ [0,1], if γ(hs
2) = γ∗,
5For the consideration of eﬃciency, we require the buyer’s strategy be left continuous at the cutoﬀ prices where
the buyer is indiﬀerent between two actions, that is, the behavioral strategy following the cutoﬀ price p1 is the same
as the behavioral strategy following p1 − .
6The seller always oﬀers p2 = h if q
B is greater than l/h, and always oﬀers p2 = l if q
G is smaller than l/h,
regardless of her belief of the buyer’s value distribution.
4where γ∗ = (l/h − qB)/(qG − qB).
3.2 Cutoﬀ Values
Recall that there are four buyer types in the ﬁrst period: (G,l), (G,h), (B,l), and (B,h). Next we
deﬁne the cutoﬀ value for each buyer type, at which the buyer type is indiﬀerent between acceptance
and rejection. Remember that qd is the probability for the buyer type to draw an h value, x(p1,1)
and x(p1,0) is the probability for the seller to oﬀer p2 = l after acceptance and rejection of p1
respectively. So the buyer’s expected payoﬀ from accepting p1 is v1−p1+δqdx(p1,1)(h−l), and the
buyer’s expected payoﬀ from rejecting p1 is δqdx(p1,0)(h−l). By comparing these two payoﬀs, the
buyer type (d,v1) accepts p1 with probability one if p1 is smaller than v1+δqd[x(p1,1)−x(p1,0)](h−
l) and rejects p1 with probability one if it is greater than v1 +δqd[x(p1,1)−x(p1,0)](h−l). Deﬁne
C(d,v1) ≡ v1 + δqd[x(p1,1) − x(p1,0)](h − l) as the Cutoﬀ Value for buyer type θ1 = (d,v1) given
x(p1,0) and x(p1,1).








if p1 < C(d,v1);
if p1 > C(d,v1);
if p1 = C(d,v1).
By deﬁnition the buyer’s cutoﬀ value depends on his type (d,v1) as well as the seller’s second-
period strategy. Figure 1 below describes the order of all buyer types’ cutoﬀ values regarding
diﬀerent strategies the seller may use in the second period. We see that the buyer types with v1 = l
always have a smaller cutoﬀ value than types with v1 = h, regardless of the value distribution
d and the seller’s strategy in the second period. However, the order of the cutoﬀ values of two
buyer types who have the same v1 but draw from diﬀerent distributions, for instance (B,l) and
(G,l), depends on the seller’s strategy in the second period. If the seller oﬀers p2 = l with a higher
probability when p1 is accepted (i.e., x(p1,0) < x(p1,1)), type (G,l) has a larger cutoﬀ value than
type (B,l). On the contrary, if the seller oﬀers p2 = l with a larger probability when p1 is rejected
than accepted (i.e., x(p1,0) > x(p1,1)), type (G,l) has a smaller cutoﬀ value than type (B,l). The
basic intuition is that, type (G,l) has a larger probability of generating an h value in the second
period and a larger expected payoﬀ if p2 = l than type (B,l), so he is more willing to take the
action that will induce the seller to oﬀer p2 = l.
3.3 Screening
In this subsection we discuss some preliminary observations on what kind of screening of buyer
types is possible/impossible in equilibrium. The ﬁrst observation (Lemma 3) is that the seller can
never oﬀer a ﬁrst-period price which separates one buyer type, say (G,h), from the other three
types, say (G,l), (B,h) and (B,l) in equilibrium. Therefore, in this two-period model, the seller
can never learn the buyer’s distribution for sure. It is possible, however, for the seller to oﬀer a p1
5If 
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Figure 1: Order of Cutoﬀs
which is accepted by h-value types and rejected by l-value types. Observation 2 (Lemma 4) shows
that the seller is more optimistic when p1 is accepted than rejected. Furthermore, observation 3
(Lemma 5) says that the diﬀerence in the seller’s posterior belief aﬀects the seller’s second-period
strategy only when she has a moderate prior belief. In that case, the seller oﬀers diﬀerent p2
conditional on whether p1 is accepted or rejected. When the seller has an extreme prior belief, her
second-period strategy is not inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst-period outcome.
Lemma 3 No ﬁrst-period oﬀer can screen one buyer type from the other three types in equilibrium.
From Figure 1 it is obvious that no p1 in equilibrium can screen one buyer type, for instance
(B,h), from the other three types (G,l), (G,h) and (B,l). To see that, suppose the seller’s strategy
is to oﬀer p2 = l if p1 is rejected and p2 = h if p1 is accepted, i.e., x(p1,0) = 1 > x(p1,1) = 0. Given
the seller’s strategy, only p1 between the cutoﬀ value of type (G,h) and (B,h) may separate type
(B,h) from the other three types, as shown in the ﬁrst case of Figure 1. This, however, cannot
happen in equilibrium, since only type (B,h) will accept such p1, and then the seller should oﬀer
p2 = l after acceptance of p1, which is contradictory to the proposed strategy. Using the same
reasoning, we can easily show that the seller cannot screen any single buyer type out.
The key point here is that the buyer types from the G distribution have a larger incentive to take
the action that induces the seller to oﬀer a low price in the second period, the seller however becomes
extremely optimistic if that action is taken by a single type drawing from the G distribution. Thus
it reaches a contradiction and cannot happen in equilibrium. The same intuition holds for the case
that the seller cannot separate a single type drawing for the B distribution.
Importantly, Lemma 3 implies that the seller is not able to learn the buyer’s distribution for
sure. Then the question is whether the seller is able to learn at all about the buyer’s type. It
turns out that partial screening may still happen in equilibrium. We ﬁnd that when that happens,
the seller is always more optimistic when p1 is accepted than rejected. Consider the case that p1
6separates the l-value buyer types, i.e. type (G,l) and (B,l), from the h-value types, i.e. type (G,h)
and (B,h). Since the cutoﬀ values of l-value types are always smaller than those of h-value types,
a price can screen the l-value types from the h-value types only if the l-value types reject the oﬀer
and the h-value types accept the oﬀer. Given that the G distribution has a higher probability of
generating an h value, the seller must be more optimistic after acceptance than rejection of p1.
This result extends even when some buyer type employs a mixed strategy between accepting and
rejecting p1. Consequently, shown by the next lemma, if p1 is both accepted and rejected by some
buyer types, the probability for the seller to oﬀer p2 = l after rejection of p1 must be at least as
high as after acceptance of p1.
Lemma 4 Let Ψ(p1,a1) denote the probability that action a1 is taken in the continuation game
following p1. If Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) for a given p1 in a PBE, then x(p1,0) ≥ x(p1,1).
We show above that the seller cannot screen one single buyer type from the other types, so it is
impossible for her to learn the buyer’s distribution for sure. However, learning still occurs when p1
separates the l-value types from the h-value types. Compared to the prior belief, the seller becomes
more optimistic when p1 is accepted and more pessimistic when p1 is rejected. Diﬀerent from Hart
and Tirole, in which the buyer’s value is the private information, in this model the seller’s belief
about the distribution from which the buyer’s values are drawn changes gradually even if she learns
the buyer’s ﬁrst-period value. Therefore, the seller’s posterior beliefs conditional on acceptance
and rejection of p1 may not be diﬀerent enough for her to oﬀer a diﬀerent p2. Intuitively, when
the seller’s prior belief is very extreme, her posterior beliefs after acceptance and rejection of p1
may still be both beyond or below the cutoﬀ belief γ∗, and the seller oﬀers the same p2 no matter
whether p1 is accepted or rejected. On contrast, when her prior belief is in a more intermediate
range, her posterior belief may be diﬀerent enough for her to oﬀer a diﬀerent p2. The following








α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)(1 − qB)
.
Based on Bayes’ rule, γ(α) and γ(α) are the seller’s posterior beliefs of the G distribution conditional
on v1 = h and v1 = l respectively. Deﬁne e α ≡ γ−1(γ∗) and b α ≡ γ−1(γ∗).7
Figure 2 plots γ(α) and γ(α) as functions of the seller’s ex ante belief α, choosing qB = 0.4,
qG = 0.8, and l/h = 0.6. The curve γ(α) is below the 450 line since the seller becomes more
pessimistic when conditional on v1 = l. On the contrary, the curve γ(α) is above the 450 line since
the seller becomes more optimistic conditional on v1 = h. Furthermore, when the seller has an
extreme ex ante belief (α smaller than e α or greater than b α), her posterior beliefs conditional on
7Both γ(α) and γ(α) are continuous and increasing in α; γ(α) < α < γ(α) for α ∈ (0,1); γ(α) = γ(α) = α for
α ∈ {0,1}. e α and b α are well-deﬁned and e α < γ











Figure 2: γ(α) and γ(α) with qB = 0.4, qG = 0.8 and l/h = 0.6
v1 = h and v1 = l are both below or above γ∗. In that case the seller oﬀers the same price even
if p1 screens l-value types from h-value types. However, when the seller has a moderate ex ante
belief (α between e α and b α), her posterior belief is above γ∗ conditional on v1 = h and below γ∗
conditional on v1 = l. So the seller oﬀers diﬀerent p2 when the buyer’s behavior suggests v1 = l or
v1 = h. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) for a given p1 in a PBE, then
(i) x(p1,0) > x(p1,1) ⇒ α ∈ [e α, b α];
(ii) α ∈ (0, e α) ∪ (b α,1) ⇒ x(p1,0) = x(p1,1).
According to the seller’s ex ante belief of the G distribution, we deﬁne a seller Pessimistic if
0 < α < e α, Moderately Pessimistic if e α < α < γ∗, Moderately Optimistic if γ∗ < α < b α, and
Optimistic if b α < α < 1. As in the previous literature, the knife-edge cases are omitted.
4 The Equilibria
In this section we present the equilibria of the game for each range of the seller’s ex ante belief
as deﬁned above. We call an equilibrium pooling if p1 on the equilibrium path is accepted with
probability one, and an equilibrium semi-separating if p1 is both accepted and rejected with a
positive probability.
4.1 Seller with Extreme Ex Ante Beliefs
Given the second part of Lemma 5, when the seller has an extreme prior, she will oﬀer the same
price in the second period regardless whether p1 is accepted or rejected. Anticipating that, a buyer
8has no incentives to strategically choose whether to accept or reject p1 in the ﬁrst period, that is, all
buyer types truthfully reveal their value and accept p1 if p1 ≤ v1. Given the buyer’s strategy, the
seller can perfectly distinguish l-value buyer types from h-value types. Due to the seller’s extreme
prior belief, her second-period strategy will be independent of the buyer’s acceptance/rejection
decision in the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 1 (Extreme Seller) When the seller is pessimistic (0 < α < e α), there is a unique
D1 equilibrium outcome in which the seller oﬀers pt = l and all buyer types accept pt for t = 1,2;
when the seller is optimistic (b α < α < 1), there is a unique D1 equilibrium outcome in which the
seller oﬀers pt = h, the buyer types with vt = h accept pt and the buyer types with vt = l reject pt,
for t = 1,2.
The outcome for optimistic seller is of particular interest to us. In the model of Hart and Tirole
(1988), in which the buyer’s value is private information but the value distribution is common
knowledge, it does not happen in any equilibrium that the h-value buyer accepts p1 = h with
probability one, even if the seller has a very optimistic ex ante belief of the buyer’s value. The
intuition is that, the seller will oﬀer p2 = l after rejection of p1 if the h-value buyer accepts p1 = h
with probability one, and then the h-value buyer has an incentive to deviate to reject p1 = h. Here
introducing the uncertainty about the buyer’s value distribution improves the seller’s revenue. We
will discuss the comparison of expected revenue between our model and Hart and Tirole (1988) in
more details in Section 5.
4.2 Seller with Moderate Ex Ante Beliefs
When the seller’s ex ante belief is moderate, the buyer’s strategy is quite diﬀerent from when
the seller has an extreme ex ante belief. First, the buyer does not always truthfully reveal his
value. Recall from Figure 2, when the seller has a moderate prior, she oﬀers p2 = h conditional
on v1 = h and p2 = l conditional on v1 = l. This gives the l-value buyer types an incentive to
signal their current values. Therefore, the two l-value buyer types may reject p1 < l, in order
to be distinguished from the h-value types and get a low oﬀer in the second period. Given that
x(p1,0) = 1 > x(p1,1) = 0, the cutoﬀ value of type (G,l) is smaller than that of type (B,l), i.e.,
type (G,l) rejects any p1 if type (B,l) rejects it. Thus, the lowest price the l-value types may reject,
denoted as p, is derived from the largest payoﬀ that type (B,l) is willing to give up now in order
to get a low price next period. So we have p ≡ l − δqB(h − l) and all buyer types accept p1 ≤ p.
For p1 ∈ (p,l] there are multiple equilibrium strategies. One equilibrium strategy, as described
above, is for the l-value buyer types to reject p1 and for the h-value buyer types to accept p1, with
the seller’s second-period strategy being x(p1,0) = 1 > x(p1,1) = 0. Another equilibrium strategy,
however, is for all buyer types to accept p1 ∈ (p,l], with the seller’s second-period strategy being
independent of whether p1 is accepted or rejected. This strategy can be supported by a consistent
belief system if the seller assigns the same beliefs following the acceptance and rejection of p1.
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Figure 3: Buyer’s Equilibrium Strategy when e α < α < b α
there also exists an equilibrium strategy in which the buyer type (G,l) rejects p1 ∈ (p,l], the h-value
buyer types accept p1 ∈ (p,l], and buyer type (B,l) plays mixed strategy.
When p1 exceeds l, the l-value types will reject the oﬀer and the h-value types will accept it
if it is relatively low. However, when p1 approaches h, the h-value types do not accept p1 with
probability one, since the gain in the ﬁrst period cannot compensate the loss from being oﬀered
with a high price in the second period. Similar to the strategy of l-value types for p1 ∈ (p,l], the
h-value types have an incentive to conceal their current value. In particular, buyer type (B,h)
accepts p1 and buyer type (G,h) plays a mixed strategy. Given x(p1,0) > x(p1,1), the cutoﬀ value
of type (G,h) is smaller than that of type (B,h), i.e., type (B,h) accepts any p1 if type (G,h)
accepts it. Therefore, the cutoﬀ price, denoted as e p, is derived from the incentive constraint of type
(G,h), and type (G,h) is the one who plays mixed strategy. Thus, the highest p1 both h-value
types accept with probability one is e p ≡ h − δqG(h − l).
To see the intuition why type (G,h) plays mixed strategy, suppose both h-value types accept
p1 ∈ (e p,h]. Then the seller oﬀers p2 = l after rejection and p2 = h after acceptance of p1. Then
buyer type (G,h) has an incentive to reject p1 since p1 > e p. But buyer type (B,h) should then
accept p1 since he gains a positive payoﬀ in the ﬁrst period and gets the low oﬀer in the second
period by revealing his distribution. Conditional on type (B,h) being the only type that accepts
p1, type (G,h) has an incentive to accept p1 as well. Thus, the unique equilibrium strategy for
type (G,h) is to play mixed strategy.
Finally, for p1 > h, all buyer types reject p1. Figure 3 and Lemma 6 summarize the buyer’s
strategy.
Lemma 6 When the seller has a moderate prior belief (e α < α < b α), the buyer’s strategy in a D1
equilibrium is as follows:
• if p1 ≤ p, all buyer types accept p1;
• if p < p1 ≤ l, there exist multiple equilibrium strategies: (1) all buyer types accept p1; (2)
type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 and type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1; (3) type (G,l) rejects p1,
10type (B,l) randomizes and type (G,h) and (B,h) accept p1;
• if l < p1 ≤ e p, type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 and type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1;
• if e p < p1 ≤ h, type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1, type (G,h) randomizes and type (B,h) accepts
p1;
• if p1 > h, all buyer types reject p1.
There are several points we ﬁnd important about the equilibrium strategies presented above.
First, although some buyer types strategically reject an oﬀer less than their ﬁrst-period value, all
buyer types truthfully reject p1 > v1, and the buyer never incurs a loss in any period in equilibrium.
This is because the seller always gets more optimistic when p1 is accepted than rejected, so no buyer
type has an incentive to accept an oﬀer larger than his value.
Second, the ﬁrst-period oﬀer accepted by all buyer types may be less than the buyer’s lowest
value l. This feature is also found by Blume (1990), Kennan (2001) and Loginova and Taylor
(2008). In all these models including ours, a buyer type with a low value in the current period has
a positive probability of drawing a high value in the next period, so the low-value type may reject
an oﬀer less than but close to his value if rejection can induce the seller to oﬀer a low price in the
next period.
Finally, the equilibrium strategies in this paper are diﬀerent from those in Kennan (2001). In
Kennan (2001), the buyer’s value changes according to a Markov process, so the seller’s posterior
belief becomes more optimistic when all buyer types accept a pooling oﬀer, and the seller oﬀers an
aggressive screening oﬀer following acceptance of several pooling oﬀers when her posterior belief
grows beyond some threshold. This pattern is described as a cyclic equilibrium. In our model, the
seller’s posterior belief is the same as her ex ante belief after acceptance of a pooling oﬀer. So we
do not expect that the same pattern as in the cyclic equilibrium emerges in this model, even in a
longer horizon.
Next we discuss the seller’s optimal p1 and conclude by describing the equilibria of the game
for moderately pessimistic and moderately optimistic seller respectively. All cases presented below
in Proposition 2-5 arise for a non-negligible set of parameters.8
4.2.1 Moderately Pessimistic Seller (e α < α < γ∗)
Given the buyer’s strategy, it is suﬃcient to consider the seller’s payoﬀ at the cutoﬀ prices p1 ∈
{p,l, e p,h}, based on the buyer’s strategy described in Lemma 6.
(1) p1 = p: The seller can always guarantee herself a payoﬀ of U1 by oﬀering p1 = p and p2 = l,
with p1 and p2 accepted by all buyer types. U1 is the seller’s lowest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer.
U1 = p + δl;
8This is proved using Mathematica. The program is available upon request.
11(2) p1 = l: Since there are multiple equilibrium strategies for the buyer following p1 ∈ (p,l], the
seller’s payoﬀ from oﬀering p1 = l depends on which strategy the buyer is using. Suppose that all
buyer types choose to accept p1 = l, then the seller obtains the highest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer
U2 by oﬀering p1 = p2 = l, with p1 and p2 accepted by all buyer types.
U2 = l + δl;
If buyer type (G,l) rejects p1, buyer type (B,l) randomizes, and buyer types (B,h) and (G,h)
accept p1, then the seller’s payoﬀ from oﬀering p1 = l is
U3 = [αqG + (1 − α)qB + (1 − α)(1 − qB)(1 − X∗)]l + δl,




(1−α)(1−qB)γ∗ is the probability that buyer type (B,l) randomizes to reject
p1 in order to make the seller indiﬀerent in oﬀering p2 = l and p2 = h after acceptance of p1,9
γ(p1,1) =
αqG
αqG + (1 − α)qB + (1 − α)(1 − X∗)(1 − qB)
= γ∗;
Finally, if both l-value buyer types choose to reject and both h-value buyer types choose to accept
p1 = l, then oﬀering p1 = l is dominated by oﬀering p1 = e p.
(3) p1 = e p: Buyer types (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1, buyer types (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1, and
the seller oﬀers p2 = l if p1 is rejected and p2 = h if p1 is accepted.
U4 = [αqG + (1 − α)qB]e p + δ[α(qG)2 + (1 − α)(qB)2]h
+δ[α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)(1 − qB)]l;
(4) p1 = h: The unique equilibrium strategy is for buyer type (G,h) to randomize, buyer type
(B,h) to accept p1, and buyer types (B,l) and (G,l) to reject p1, then the seller’s payoﬀ is
U5 = [αqG(1 − Y ∗) + (1 − α)qB]h + δl,
where Y ∗ = 1−
(1−α)qBγ∗
αqG(1−γ∗) is the probability that buyer type (G,h) randomizes to reject p1 in order
to make the seller indiﬀerent in oﬀering p2 = l or p2 = h after acceptance of p1,
γ(p1,1) =
α(1 − Y ∗)qG
α(1 − Y ∗)qG + (1 − α)qB = γ∗.
Comparing the payoﬀs above, we ﬁnd that there always exists a pooling equilibrium with p1 = l,
since the highest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer U2 is always greater than any payoﬀ from a semi-
separating oﬀer max{U3,U4,U5}. Surprisingly, this result implies that the payoﬀs for a moderately
pessimistic seller is no better than those for a pessimistic seller. Intuitively, although the ex ante
prior of the h-value buyer types increases for a moderately pessimistic seller, the buyer’s strategic
behavior makes the seller weakly worse oﬀ.
9Since the seller is more optimistic after acceptance of p1 than rejection of p1, her posterior belief γ(p1,1) > γ(p1,0).
Therefore, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, γ(p1,1) = γ
∗ if α < γ
∗ and γ(p1,0) = γ
∗ if α > γ
∗.
12Recall that given p1 ∈ [p,l] the l-value buyer types may both accept or both reject p1. Therefore,
when the lowest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer U1 is greater than the payoﬀ from oﬀering p1 = e p
or p1 = h, i.e., max{U4,U5}, any p∗
1 ∈ [p,l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium, with both l-
value buyer types accepting p1 ≤ p∗
1 and rejecting p1 > p∗
1. When U1 is less than max{U4,U5},
there exists a pooling oﬀer p0 ∈ [p,l] which gives the seller the same payoﬀ as max{U4,U5}, since
U2 > max{U4,U5}. So any p∗
1 ∈ [p0,l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium, with the l-value buyer
types accepting p1 ≤ p∗
1 and rejecting p1 > p∗
1.
Proposition 2 (MP Seller: Pooling Equilibria) When the seller is moderately pessimistic, there
always exists a pooling D1 equilibrium with p1 = l.
(i) If U1 > max{U4,U5}, any p1 ∈ [p,l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium;
(ii) If U1 < max{U4,U5}, any p1 ∈ [p0,l], with p < p0 < l, can arise in a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3 presents the conditions for semi-separating D1 equilibria. If the lowest payoﬀ
from a pooling oﬀer U1 is greater than the highest payoﬀ from a semi-separating oﬀer, then there
is no semi-separating equilibrium. On the contrary, if U1 is less than the highest payoﬀ from a
semi-separating oﬀer, then semi-separating equilibria exist. Furthermore, if p1 = e p or p1 = h gives
the highest payoﬀ among all semi-separating oﬀers, the equilibrium path of the semi-separating
equilibria is unique. If p1 = l gives the highest semi-separating payoﬀ, then a continuum equilibrium
price p1 ∈ [p00,l], with p < p00 < l, arises.
Proposition 3 (MP Seller: Semi-separating Equilibria) When the seller is moderately pes-
simistic, the semi-separating D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If U1 > max{U3,U4,U5}, no semi-separating equilibrium exists;
(ii) If U1 < max{U3,U4,U5} = max{U4,U5}, semi-separating equilibria exist and the path is
unique, with p1 = e p or p1 = h;
(iii) If U1 < max{U3,U4,U5} = U3, any p1 ∈ [p00,l], with p < p00 < l, can arise in a semi-
separating equilibrium, so does p1 = e p or p1 = h if max{U4,U5} > U1.
4.2.2 Moderately Optimistic Seller (γ∗ < α < b α)
In this subsection we discuss the pooling equilibria and semi-separating equilibria for a seller with
moderately optimistic ex ante beliefs. Similar to last subsection, we start with the seller’s payoﬀs
from oﬀering the cutoﬀ prices p1 ∈ {p,l, e p,h}.
(1) p1 = p: Payoﬀ V1 is the seller’s lowest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer with p1 = p and p2 = h,
p1 accepted by all buyer types and p2 accepted by types with v2 = h.
V1 = p + δ[αqG + (1 − α)qB]h;
(2) p1 = l: Payoﬀ V2 is the seller’s highest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer with p1 = l and p2 = h,
p1 accepted by all buyer types and p2 accepted by types with v2 = h.
V2 = l + δ[αqG + (1 − α)qB]h;
13Payoﬀ V3 is the seller’s payoﬀ from oﬀering p1 = l, buyer type (G,l) rejects p1, buyer type (B,l)
randomizes, and buyer types (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1.
V3 = [αqG + (1 − α)qB + (1 − α)(1 − qB)(1 − X∗∗)]l + δ[αqG + (1 − α)qB]h,
where X∗∗ =
α(1−qG)(1−γ∗)
(1−α)(1−qB)γ∗ is the probability that buyer type (B,l) randomizes to reject p1 in order
to make the seller indiﬀerent in oﬀering p2 = l or p2 = h after rejection of p1,
γ(p1,0) =
α(1 − qG)
α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)X∗∗(1 − qB)
= γ∗;
(3) p1 = e p: Payoﬀ V4 = U4 is the seller’s payoﬀ when buyer types (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1,
buyer types (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1, and the seller oﬀers p2 = l if p1 is rejected and p2 = h if
p1 is accepted.
V4 = [αqG + (1 − α)qB]e p + δ[α(qG)2 + (1 − α)(qB)2]h
+δ[α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)(1 − qB)]l;
(4) p1 = h: Payoﬀ V5 is the seller’s payoﬀ from oﬀering p1 = h, buyer type (G,h) randomizes,
buyer type (B,h) accepts p1, and buyer types (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1.
V5 = [αqG(1 − Y ∗∗) + (1 − α)qB]h + δ[αqG + (1 − α)qB]h,




qG is the probability that buyer type (G,h) randomizes to reject p1
to make the seller indiﬀerent in oﬀering p2 = l or p2 = h after rejection of p1,
γ(p1,0) =
αY ∗∗qG + α(1 − qG)
αY ∗∗qG + α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)(1 − qB)
= γ∗.
The proof of next two propositions are similar to the proof of Proposition 2 and 3 and are
therefore omitted.
Proposition 4 (MO Seller: Pooling Equilibrium) When the seller is moderately optimistic,
the pooling D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If V1 > max{V4,V5}, any p1 ∈ [p,l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium;
(ii) If V1 < max{V4,V5} < V2, any p1 ∈ [p000,l], with p < p000 < l, can arise in a pooling
equilibrium;
(iii) If V2 < max{V4,V5}, no pooling equilibrium exists.
Diﬀerent from the results for a moderately pessimistic seller, case (iii) in Proposition 4 implies
that it is possible for a semi-separating equilibrium to emerge even if all buyer types accept p1 ∈
(p,l]. That is, when the seller’s ex ante belief is suﬃciently optimistic, the best pooling oﬀer does
not necessarily arise as an equilibrium price. This ﬁnding is diﬀerent from that of Loginova and
Taylor (2008). They argue that the seller never oﬀers a ﬁrst-period price that yields valuable
information about the buyer’s distribution in a Good equilibrium where all buyer types accept
14p1 less than l. But that conclusion depends on the assumption of no discounting. We ﬁnd that
case (iii) of Proposition 4 arises for a non-negligible set of parameters when the discount factor is
suﬃciently low.
When the seller is moderately optimistic, the conditions for the semi-separating D1 equilibria
are similar to those when the seller is moderately pessimistic.
Proposition 5 (MO Seller: Semi-separating Equilibrium) When the seller is moderately op-
timistic, the semi-separating D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If V1 > max{V3,V4,V5}, no semi-separating equilibrium exists;
(ii) If V1 < max{V3,V4,V5} = max{V4,V5}, a semi-separating equilibrium exists and the path
is unique, with p1 = e p or p1 = h;
(iii) If V1 < max{V3,V4,V5} = V3, any p1 ∈ [p0000,l], with p < p0000 < l, can arise in a semi-
separating equilibrium, so does p1 = e p or p1 = h if max{V4,V5} > V1.
5 Comparison of Expected Revenue
The most important question that this paper is concerned with is whether the seller improves her
revenue and gains more monopoly power with the uncertainty about the buyer’s value distribution.
In this section, we address this issue by comparing the seller’s expected revenue in our model with
that in the two-period version of Hart and Tirole’s (1988) rental model, where the buyer’s value
distribution is common knowledge.
The two-period version of Hart and Tirole’s (1988) rental model is as follows. The buyer has
private information about his value, which can be either high or low. The buyer’s value is drawn
at the beginning of the game and is ﬁxed once realized. In each period t = 1 or 2, the seller
oﬀers a rental price and the buyer decides whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. Let µ denote the
seller’s ex ante belief that she is facing a high-value buyer. In order to make a fair comparison,
we require that the ex ante probabilities of the high-value buyer in both models be equal, that is,
µ = αqG + (1 − α)qB. The following proposition compares the expected revenues in the equilibria
of the two models for any ex ante belief the seller may have.
Proposition 6 (Revenue Comparison) If the ex ante probability of high value buyer type in the
two-period version of Hart and Tirole’s (1988) rental model is the same as in this model, then
(i) for an optimistic seller, the seller’s revenue is higher than in Hart and Tirole;
(ii) for a moderately optimistic seller, if qB is small enough and qG is big enough, there exists
α ∈ (γ∗, b α) such that, for all α ∈ (α, b α), the seller’s revenue is higher than in Hart and Tirole;
(iii) for a pessimistic and moderately pessimistic seller, there always exists an equilibrium in
this model which yields the same revenue as in Hart and Tirole.
When the seller has an optimistic ex ante belief, her revenue in our model is higher than that
in Hart and Tirole’s (1988). As shown in Proposition 1, the buyer types with v1 = h accept p1 = h
with probability one since the seller oﬀers p2 = h independent of whether p1 is accepted or rejected.
15In contrast, in the two-period version of Hart and Tirole’s rental model, the high value buyer rejects
p1 = h with a positive probability even if the seller is optimistic enough to oﬀer equilibrium price
p1 = h, since otherwise the seller oﬀers p2 = l after rejection of p1 and the high-value buyer has an
incentive to deviate to reject p1.
When the seller has a pessimistic or moderately pessimistic ex ante belief, there always exists
a pooling equilibrium in our model where the seller oﬀers p1 = p2 = l and all buyer types accept
the oﬀers. This equilibrium yields the seller the same expected revenue as in Hart and Tirole.
When the seller has a moderately optimistic ex ante belief, she can still be better oﬀ than in
Hart and Tirole (1988) if the two distributions are suﬃciently diﬀerent, that is, qB is small enough
and qG is big enough, and the seller’s ex ante belief is suﬃciently optimistic. However, if the seller’s
ex ante belief is close to the lower bound of moderately optimistic beliefs, γ∗, then the seller is
worse oﬀ than in Hart and Tirole (1988).
From Proposition 6 we conclude that, when the seller has suﬃciently optimistic ex ante beliefs,
the seller is better oﬀ compared to the case that the distribution of the buyer’s value is common
knowledge.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a two-period repeated bargaining model where the seller oﬀers a
price to rent a durable good in each period. The buyer’s value of consuming the durable good is
drawn from a ﬁxed distribution in each period. The buyer has private information not only about
his value in each period, but also about the distribution which his values are drawn from.
We compare the seller’s expected revenue in our model with that in the two-period version
of Hart and Tirole’s (1988) rental model where the distribution of the buyer’s value is common
knowledge, under the assumption that the ex ante probabilities of high value buyer types are the
same in the two models. We ﬁnd that the seller is better oﬀ with the additional layer of uncertainty
about the buyer’s value distribution when she has suﬃciently optimistic ex ante beliefs.
The results we found may cast some light on the longer horizon. In the current two-period
model, the seller cannot perfectly learn the buyer’s value distribution. It is interesting to examine
whether the seller is able to learn the buyer’s distribution eventually if she is allowed to employ
price experimentation in a ﬁnite or an inﬁnite horizon.
On the other hand, this model only allows the seller to rent the durable good. For future
research, we are interested in investigating the case where the seller is able to adopt a more general
strategy, such as selling the durable good or providing both options of selling and renting the
durable good to the buyer.
167 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.
Step 1: Suppose x(p1,0) > x(p1,1). Then C(G,l) < C(B,l) < l < C(G,h) < C(B,h) <
h. A price p1 can screen one type from the other types only if p1 ∈ [C(G,l),C(B,l)] or p1 ∈
[C(G,h),C(B,h)].
If p1 ∈ [C(G,l),C(B,l)] and only type (G,l) rejects p1, then x(p1,0) = 0, so it contradicts with
x(p1,0) > x(p1,1).
If p1 ∈ [C(G,h),C(B,h)] and only type (B,h) accepts p1, then x(p1,1) = 1, so it contradicts
with x(p1,0) > x(p1,1).
Step 2: Suppose x(p1,0) < x(p1,1). Then l < C(B,l) < C(G,l) < h < C(B,h) < C(G,h).
A price p1 can screen one type from the other types only if p1 ∈ [C(B,l),C(G,l)] or p1 ∈
[C(B,h),C(G,h)].
If p1 ∈ [C(B,l),C(G,l)] and only type (B,l) rejects p1, then x(p1,0) = 1, so it contradicts with
x(p1,0) < x(p1,1).
If p1 ∈ [C(B,h),C(G,h)] and only type (G,h) accepts p1, then x(p1,1) = 0, so it contradicts
with x(p1,0) < x(p1,1).
Step 3: Suppose x(p1,0) = x(p1,1). Then C(B,l) = C(G,l) = l < C(B,h) = C(G,h) = h.
If p1 ≤ l, all types accept p1.
If p1 > h, all types reject p1.
If l < p1 ≤ h, both type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 and both type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1.
In any case, screening one buyer type cannot happen in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) and x(p1,0) < x(p1,1) in a PBE. Then l <
C(B,l) < C(G,l) < h < C(B,h) < C(G,h), and Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) only if p1 ∈ [C(B,l),C(G,h)].
We will show that it reaches a contradiction for any p1 ∈ [C(B,l),C(G,h)].
If p1 ∈ [C(B,l),C(G,l)), then only type (B,l) rejects p1 and x(p1,0) = 1 ≥ x(p1,1).
If p1 ∈ (C(B,h),C(G,h)], then only type (G,h) accepts p1 and x(p1,1) = 0 ≤ x(p1,0).
If p1 ∈ (C(G,l),C(B,h)), then γ(p1,0) = γ(α) < α < γ(α) = γ(p1,1) and x(p1,0) ≥ x(p1,1).
Denote X0 as the probability for type (G,l) to reject p1 = C(G,l) and Y 0 as the probability for
type (B,h) to reject p1 = C(B,h).
If p1 = C(G,l),
γ(p1,0) =
αX0(1 − qG)




αqG + α(1 − X0)(1 − qG)
αqG + (1 − α)qB + α(1 − X0)(1 − qG)
> γ(α),
so x(p1,0) ≥ x(p1,1).
If p1 = C(B,h),
γ(p1,0) =
α(1 − qG)




αqG + (1 − α)(1 − Y 0)qB > γ(α),
so x(p1,0) ≥ x(p1,1).
Since every case leads to a contradiction with x(p1,0) < x(p1,1), the seller oﬀers x(p1,0) ≥
x(p1,1) in a PBE if Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1).
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) and x(p1,0) > x(p1,1) ⇒ α ∈ [e α, b α].
Suppose Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1), x(p1,0) > x(p1,1) and α ∈ (0, e α) ∪ (b α,1). Then C(G,l) < C(B,l) <
l < C(G,h) < C(B,h) < h. Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) only if p1 ∈ [C(G,l),C(B,h)]. We will show that it
reaches a contradiction for any p1 ∈ [C(G,l),C(B,h)].
If p1 ∈ [C(G,l),C(B,l)), then only type (G,l) rejects p1 and x(p1,0) = 0 ≤ x(p1,1).
If p1 ∈ (C(G,h),C(B,h)], then only type (B,h) accepts p1 and x(p1,1) = 1 ≥ x(p1,0).
If p1 ∈ (C(B,l),C(G,h)) and α < e α, then γ(p1,1) = γ(α) < γ∗ and x(p1,1) = 1 ≥ x(p1,0).
If p1 ∈ (C(B,l),C(G,h)) and α > b α, then γ(p1,0) = γ(α) > γ∗ and x(p1,0) = 0 ≤ x(p1,1).
Denote X as the probability for type (B,l) to reject p1 = C(B,l) and Y as the probability for
type (G,h) to reject p1 = C(G,h).
If p1 = C(B,l),
γ(p1,0) =
α(1 − qG)





αqG + (1 − α)qB + (1 − α)(1 − X)(1 − qB)
< γ(α).
When α < e α, γ(p1,1) < γ(α) < γ∗ and x(p1,1) = 1 ≥ x(p1,0). When α > b α, γ(p1,0) > γ(α) > γ∗
and x(p1,0) = 0 ≤ x(p1,1).
If p1 = C(G,h),
γ(p1,0) =
αY qG + α(1 − qG)




α(1 − Y )qG
α(1 − Y )qG + (1 − α)qB < γ(α).
When α < e α, γ(p1,1) < γ(α) < γ∗ and x(p1,1) = 1 ≥ x(p1,0). When α > b α, γ(p1,0) > γ(α) > γ∗
and x(p1,0) = 0 ≤ x(p1,1).
Therefore, every case is contradictory to x(p1,0) > x(p1,1).
(ii) It is directly derived from Lemma 4 and (i) of Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Part 1: Pessimistic Seller
Step 1: We ﬁrst show that it is the unique D1 equilibrium strategy for the buyer to accept p1
if and only if p1 ≤ v1.
18(1) Suppose x(p1,0) > x(p1,1). Lemma 5 implies that either all buyer types accept p1 or all
buyer types reject p1. Given α < e α and x(p1,0) > x(p1,1), it must be the case that all buyer
types reject p1, otherwise x(p1,1) = 1. Since x(p1,0) > x(p1,1) and all buyer types reject p1,
p1 > C(B,h), which is less than h. But Lemma 7 shows that a PBE cannot pass criterion D1 if all
buyer types reject p1 < h. Therefore, p1 ≥ h and all buyer types reject p1.
(2) Suppose x(p1,0) < x(p1,1). Given α < e α, Lemma 5 implies that p1 ≤ C(B,l) =
min
θ1
{C(θ1)}, which is greater than l, and all buyer types accept p1. But Lemma 7 shows that
a PBE cannot pass criterion D1 if all buyer types accept p1 > l. Therefore, p1 ≤ l and all buyer
types accept p1.
(3) Suppose x(p1,0) = x(p1,1). All buyer types accept p1 if and only if p1 ≤ v1 for any p1.
Combining three cases above, it is the unique D1 equilibrium strategy for the buyer to accept
p1 if and only if p1 ≤ v1.
Step 2: Given the buyer’s strategy, the seller oﬀers p1 = l or p1 = h, and always oﬀers p2 = l
on the equilibrium path. The respective payoﬀs for the seller is:
(
π(l) = l + δl;
π(h) = αh + δl.
Given α < e α < γ∗, it is optimal to oﬀer p1 = l.
Part 2: Optimistic Seller
Step 1: Similar to the pessimistic seller, we ﬁrst show that it is the unique D1 equilibrium
strategy for the buyer to accept p1 if and only if p1 ≤ v1.
(1) Suppose x(p1,0) > x(p1,1). Given α > b α, Lemma 5 implies that p1 ≤ C(G,l) =
min
θ1
{C(θ1)} < l, and all buyer types accept p1. Lemma 7 shows it passes criterion D1.
(2) Suppose x(p1,0) < x(p1,1). Given α > b α, Lemma 5 implies that p1 > C(G,h) =
max
θ1
{C(θ1)} > h, and all buyer types reject p1. Lemma 7 shows it passes criterion D1.
(3) Suppose x(p1,0) = x(p1,1). All buyer types accept p1 if and only if p1 ≤ v1 for any p1.
Combining three cases above, it is the unique D1 equilibrium strategy for the buyer to accept
p1 if and only if p1 ≤ v1.
Step 2: Given the buyer’s strategy, the seller oﬀers p1 = l or p1 = h, and always oﬀers p2 = h
on the equilibrium path. The respective payoﬀs for the seller is:
(
π(l) = l + δαh;
π(h) = αh + δαh.
Since α > b α > γ∗, it is optimal to oﬀer p1 = h.
Proof of Lemma 6. We try to derive all the possible buyer’s strategies following diﬀerent
second-period strategy of the seller.
(1) Suppose x(p1,0) < x(p1,1).
We have l < C(B,l) < C(G,l) < h < C(B,h) < C(G,h). Lemma 4 implies that p1 must
be accepted or rejected with probability one given x(p1,0) < x(p1,1). Given x(p1,0) < x(p1,1),
19when e α < α < γ∗, p1 ≤ C(B,l) and all buyer types accept p1. When γ∗ < α < b α, p1 > C(G,h)
and all buyer types reject p1. Lemma 7 shows that the equilibrium cannot pass criterion D1 if all
types accept p1 > l. Thus, when e α < α < γ∗, p1 ≤ l and all types accept p1. When γ∗ < α < b α,
p1 > C(G,h) > h and all buyer types reject p1.
(2) Suppose x(p1,0) = x(p1,1).
We have C(G,l) = C(B,l) = l < C(G,h) = C(B,h) = h. Therefore, for p1 ≤ l all buyer types
accept p1, and for p1 > h all types reject p1. For p1 ∈ (l,h], type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 and
type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1, so x(p1,0) = 1 and x(p1,1) = 0 given e α < α < b α, which leads to
a contradiction.
(3) Suppose x(p1,0) > x(p1,1).
We have C(G,l) < C(B,l) < l < C(G,h) < C(B,h) < h. Next we divide all the possibilities
into three cases.
Case 1: p1 is accepted or rejected with probability one, i.e., Ψ(p1,1) ∈ {0,1}. So when
e α < α < γ∗, p1 > C(B,h) and all buyer types reject p1. When γ∗ < α < b α, p1 ≤ C(G,l) and
all buyer types accept p1. Lemma 7 shows that the equilibrium cannot pass criterion D1 if all
buyer types reject p1 < h. Thus, when e α < α < γ∗, p1 > h and all buyer types reject p1. When
γ∗ < α < b α, p1 ≤ C(G,l) < l and all buyer types accept p1.
Case 2: p1 is accepted and rejected with a positive probability, i.e., Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1), and the
seller plays pure strategy in the second period, i.e., x(p1,0) = 1 and x(p1,1) = 0. Lemma 3 shows
that no p1 separates a single type from other types. So p1 ∈ (C(B,l),C(G,h)] = (p, e p]. Type (B,l)
and (G,l) reject p1 and type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1.
Case 3: p1 is accepted and rejected with a positive probability, i.e., Ψ(p1,1) ∈ (0,1), and the
seller plays mixed strategy in the second period, i.e., 0 < x(p1,0) − x(p1,1) < 1. Then either
x(p1,0) = 1 and x(p1,1) ∈ (0,1) or x(p1,0) ∈ (0,1) and x(p1,1) = 0, since the knife-edge condition
α = γ∗ is omitted. The former implies γ(p1,0) < γ∗ and γ(p1,1) = γ∗, and the latter implies
γ(p1,0) = γ∗ and γ(p1,1) > γ∗. Therefore, γ(p1,1) = γ∗ when e α < α < γ∗, and γ(p1,0) = γ∗ when
γ∗ < α < b α. From Lemma 3, it is not possible for type (G,l) or (B,h) to randomize, otherwise the
seller can at least sometimes separate type (G,l) or (B,h) from other types. So only type (B,l)
and (G,h) may play mixed strategy.
When e α < α < γ∗, type (B,l) randomizes to reject p1 with probability X∗, (G,l) rejects p1,
and (G,h) and (B,h) accept p1. Then
γ(p1,1) =
αqG
αqG + (1 − α)qB + (1 − α)(1 − X∗)(1 − qB)
= γ∗.
Type (B,l) is indiﬀerent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
l − p1 + δqBx(p1,1)(h − l) = δqB(h − l).




(1−α)(1−qB)γ∗, and the seller oﬀers
x(p1,1) = 1 −
l−p1
δqB(h−l), x(p1,0) = 1.
20When γ∗ < α < b α, type (B,l) randomizes to reject p1 with probability X∗∗, (G,l) rejects p1,
and (G,h) and (B,h) accept p1. Then
γ(p1,0) =
α(1 − qG)
α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)X∗∗(1 − qB)
= γ∗.
Type (B,l) is indiﬀerent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
l − p1 = δqBx(p1,0)(h − l).
So type (B,l) rejects p1 ∈ (p,l] with probability X∗∗ =
α(1−qG)(1−γ∗)
(1−α)(1−qB)γ∗, and the seller oﬀers x(p1,0) =
l−p1
δqB(h−l) and x(p1,1) = 0.
When e α < α < γ∗, type (G,h) randomizes to reject p1 with probability Y ∗, (B,l) and (G,l)
reject p1, and (B,h) accepts p1. Then
γ(p1,1) =
α(1 − Y ∗)qG
α(1 − Y ∗)qG + (1 − α)qB = γ∗.
Type (G,h) is indiﬀerent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
h − p1 + δqGx(p1,1)(h − l) = δqG(h − l).
So type (G,h) rejects p1 ∈ (e p,h] with probability Y ∗ = 1−
(1−α)qBγ∗
αqG(1−γ∗), and the seller oﬀers x(p1,1) =
1 −
h−p1
δqG(h−l) and x(p1,0) = 1.
When γ∗ < α < b α, type (G,h) randomizes to reject p1 with probability Y ∗∗, (B,l) and (G,l)
reject p1, and (B,h) accepts p1. Then
γ(p1,0) =
αY ∗∗qG + α(1 − qG)
αY ∗∗qG + α(1 − qG) + (1 − α)(1 − qB)
= γ∗.
Type (G,h) is indiﬀerent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
h − p1 = δqGx(p1,0)(h − l).




qG and the seller oﬀers
x(p1,0) =
h−p1
δqG(h−l) and x(p1,1) = 0.
Lemma 6 comes from the combination of three steps.
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1: First we show that U2 > max{U4,U5} for e α < α < γ∗. Given
this, there always exists a pooling equilibrium with p1 = l on the equilibrium path and all buyer
types accepting p1 ∈ [p,l].
U4 − U2
= δ(1 − α)qBl(qG − 1) + δαqGl(qG − 1)
+δ(1 − α)qBh(qB − qG) + [αqGh + (1 − α)qBh − l]
< 0
21Each item on the right hand side of the equation is negative for e α < α < γ∗.
By plugging Y ∗ into the deﬁnition of U5, U5 = 1−α
1−γ∗qBh + δl, which is decreasing in α. So
U5 − U2
<
1 − e α
1 − γ∗qBh − l
=
h
qG + qB − l/h
(l/h − qG)(l/h − qB) < 0.
Step 2: (i)If U1 > max{U4,U5}, for an arbitrary p∗
1 ∈ [p,l], assume all buyer types accept
p1 ∈ [p,p∗
1], type (B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 ∈ (p∗
1,l], and type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1 ∈ (p∗
1,l],
then p∗
1 is the optimal p1.
(ii) Since U1 = p + δl < max{U4,U5} < U2 = l + δl, there exists p0 ∈ (p,l) such that u(p0) =
p0 +δl = max{U4,U5}. For an arbitrary p∗
1 ∈ [p0,l], assume all buyer types accept p1 ∈ [p,p∗
1], type
(B,l) and (G,l) reject p1 ∈ (p∗
1,l], and type (B,h) and (G,h) accept p1 ∈ (p∗
1,l]. Then p∗
1 is the
optimal p1 given u(p0) = max{U4,U5}.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) By deﬁnition U3, U4 and U5 are the potential highest payoﬀs
in a semi-separating equilibrium. If the lowest payoﬀ from a pooling oﬀer, U1, is greater than
max{U3,U4,U5}, there is no semi-separating equilibrium.
(ii) For all p1 ∈ (p,l], the buyer can adopt two semi-separating equilibrium strategies: 1) types
with v1 = l reject p1 and types with v1 = h accept p1, or 2) types with v1 = h accept p1, type
(G,l) rejects p1 and type (B,l) randomizes. If the ﬁrst strategy is adopted at p1 ∈ (p,l], the seller’s
payoﬀ by oﬀering p1 is less than U4. If the second strategy is adopted, the payoﬀ is weakly less
than U3, which is less than max{U4,U5}. Therefore, when the buyer adopts either of these two
strategies, given U1 < max{U4,U5}, a semi-separating equilibrium exists and the path is unique,
with p1 = e p or p1 = h, depending on whether U4 or U5 is larger.
(iii) Deﬁne U(p1,X∗) = [αqG+(1−α)qB+(1−α)(1−qB)(1−X∗)]p1+δl, which is increasing in
p1 ∈ (p,l]. First suppose max{U4,U5} < U1 < U3. By deﬁnition U(p,X∗) < U1 < U3 = U(l,X∗).
Therefore, there exists p00 ∈ (p,l) such that U(p00,X∗) = U1. For any arbitrary p∗
1 ∈ [p00,l] , assume
the buyer uses the second strategy for p∗
1 ≤ p00 and uses the ﬁrst strategy described in part (ii) for
p∗
1 > p00, then p∗
1 ∈ [p00,l] is the optimal p1.
Then suppose U1 < max{U4,U5} < U3. Since U(p,X∗) < U1 < U3 = U(l,X∗), U(p,X∗) <
max{U4,U5} < U(l,X∗). Deﬁne p00 ∈ (p,l) such that U(p00,X∗) = max{U4,U5}. If for any arbitrary
p∗
1 ∈ [p00,l], the buyer uses the second strategy described in part (ii) for p∗
1 ≤ p00 and uses the ﬁrst
strategy for p∗
1 > p00 , then p∗
1 ∈ [p00,l] is the optimal p1. If for any p1 ∈ (p,l], the buyer uses the
ﬁrst strategy, then p1 = e p or p1 = h is optimal, depending on whether U4 or U5 is larger.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Step 1: We ﬁrst describe the equilibrium in the two-period version of Hart and Tirole’s rental
model.
In period 2, both types accept p2 if and only if p2 ≤ v2 and reject p2 otherwise. In the ﬁrst
period, the l-type buyer accepts p1 if and only if p1 ≤ l and reject p1 otherwise. If µ < l/h, the
22h-type buyer accepts p1 ≤ h − δ(h − l) and reject p1 > h − δ(h − l). If µ > l/h, the h-type buyer
accepts p1 ≤ h − δ(h − l), randomizes to accept p1 ∈ (h − δ(h − l),h] with probability y∗ =
µh−l
µ(h−l),
and reject p1 > h. Therefore, if µ < l/h, the seller oﬀers p1 = p2 = l; if l/h < µ <
hl+δl(h−l)
hl+δh(h−l), the
seller oﬀers p1 = h−δ(h−l), p2 = h if p1 is accepted and p2 = l if p1 is rejected; if µ >
hl+δl(h−l)
hl+δh(h−l),






µ[h − δ(h − l)] + δµh + δ(1 − µ)l = µh + δl,
µy∗h + δµh =
µh2−hl+δµh2−δµhl
h−l
if µ < l/h;






Step 2: Next we compare the revenue in our model with that in Hart and Tirole, assuming
that µ = αqG + (1 − α)qB. Notice that α > γ∗ is equivalent to µ > l/h. For convenience, denote
W1 = µh + δl and W2 = µy∗h + δµh.
(i) For an optimistic seller (α > b α), there is a unique equilibrium outcome as shown in Propo-
sition 2, and the seller’s revenue in our model is
(αqG + (1 − α)qB)h + δ(αqG + (1 − α)qB)h
= µh + δµh
> max{W1,W2}.
So the seller’s revenue in our model is higher than in Hart and Tirole’s.
(ii) For a moderately optimistic seller (γ∗ < α < b α), it suﬃces to compare the potential optimal
revenues W1 and W2 in Hart and Tirole with the potential optimal revenues V2, V4 and V5 in our
model. Our proof consists of the following results.
Result 1:
W1 − V2 = (1 − δ)(µh − l) > 0
Result 2:
W1 − V4 = δ(1 − α)qB(qG − qB)h + δµ(1 − qG)l > 0.
Result 3:
V5 > W2 if qG > 1 − qB + qB(l/h).
V5 − W2
= [αqG(1 − Y ∗∗) + (1 − α)qB]h − µy∗h














If (1 − qB)(1 − l/h) < qG − l/h, then V5 > W2 when
α <
l/h − qB








23The RHS of the inequality is decreasing in qG and converges to 1 when qG → 1, therefore the RHS
of the inequality is greater than 1, so the inequality always holds when (1−qB)(1−l/h) < qG−l/h.






l/h + δ(l/h)(1 − l/h)




l/h + δ(l/h)(1 − l/h)
l/h + δ(1 − l/h)
− qB] ≡ α
It is easy to show that α > γ∗. Next we need to show the conditions under which α < b α.




l/h + δ(l/h)(1 − l/h)
l/h + δ(1 − l/h)
− qB] <
1 − qB





l/h + δ(l/h)(1 − l/h)
l/h + δ(1 − l/h)
− qB <
(1 − qB)(l/h − qB)
(1 − qB) − (qG − l/h)
At the same time,
qG − l/h > (1 − qB)(1 − l/h)
⇔ (1 − qB) − (qG − l/h) < (1 − qB) − (1 − qB)(1 − l/h)





(1 − qB)(l/h − qB)
(1 − qB) − (qG − l/h)
To show α < b α, it is suﬃcient to show that
l/h + δ(l/h)(1 − l/h)





which is satisﬁed when qB <
δ(l/h)(1−l/h)
l/h+δ(1−l/h).
Combining Result 1, 2, 3, and 4, we have shown that, if qG > (1 − qB)(1 − l/h) + l/h and
qB <
δ(l/h)(1−l/h)
l/h+δ(1−l/h), there exists α ∈ (γ∗, b α) such that, for α ∈ (α, b α), V5 > W2 > W1 > max{V2,V4}.
Therefore, V5 is the optimal revenue in our model and it is higher than the optimal revenue in the
two-period version of Hart and Tirole (1988).
(iii) For a pessimistic seller or moderately pessimistic seller (α < γ∗), there always exists a
pooling equilibrium in which the seller oﬀers p1 = p2 = l and all buyer types accept the oﬀer as
shown in Proposition 1 and 3. This equilibrium yields revenue l + δl, which is the same as in Hart
and Tirole’s (1988).
8 Appendix B: Criterion D1
The following deﬁnition of Criterion D1 is modiﬁed from Cho and Kreps (1987).
24Consider a ﬁxed equilibrium on the continuation of p1, with action a1 ∈ {0,1} reached with
zero probability. Suppose x(p1,1) and x(p1,0) is the seller’s equilibrium strategy.
Step 1: Find the sets of all (mixed) responses φ by the seller that would cause type θ1 = (d,v1) to
defect from the equilibrium and to be indiﬀerent. If a1 = 0 is the out-of-equilibrium action, form
the sets
Dθ1 ≡ {φ : (v1 − p1) + δqdx(p1,1)(h − l) < δqdφ(h − l),φ ∈ [0,1]},
D0
θ1 ≡ {φ : (v1 − p1) + δqdx(p1,1)(h − l) = δqdφ(h − l),φ ∈ [0,1]}.
If a1 = 1 is the out-of-equilibrium action, form the sets
Dθ1 ≡ {φ : (v1 − p1) + δqdφ(h − l) > δqdx(p1,0)(h − l),φ ∈ [0,1]},
D0
θ1 ≡ {φ : (v1 − p1) + δqdφ(h − l) = δqdx(p1,0)(h − l),φ ∈ [0,1]}.
Step 2: For a given out-of-equilibrium action a1, if for some type θ1 there exists a second type e θ1
with Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 ( De θ1, then the combination (θ1,a1) may be pruned from the continuation game
following p1.
Step 3: Check whether the ﬁxed equilibrium is still sequentially rational given that the seller’s
belief is restricted to the buyer types who survive from Step 2. If not, then the equilibrium does
not survive from D1.
Given a PBE, if the corresponding equilibrium in all the continuation games following p1 ∈ R
survives from D1, then we say that the PBE survives from D1.
The eﬀect of applying criterion D1 in our model is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 The equilibrium in the continuation game can not pass criterion D1 if all buyer types
accept p1 > l or all buyer types reject p1 < h; The equilibrium in the continuation game passes
criterion D1 if all buyer types accept p1 ≤ l or all buyer types reject p1 ≥ h.
Proof of Lemma 7. Part 1: Suppose all buyer types accept p1 > l. Then x(p1,1) > x(p1,0) and
x(p1,1) = 1 without considering the knife-edge case that α = γ∗. Since max{x(p1,1)−x(p1,0)} = 1
and all types accept p1, p1 ≤ min
(d,v1)
{v1+δqd(h−l)} = l+δqB(h−l) by the deﬁnition of cutoﬀ value.
Apply the deﬁnition of D1 in the case that a1 = 0 is the out-of-equilibrium message and form
the sets Dθ1 and D0
θ1 for each buyer type θ1. So Dθ1 = {φ : φ > x(p1,1) +
v1−p1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]} and
D0
θ1 = {φ : φ = x(p1,1)+
v1−p1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]}. Therefore, for x(p1,1) = 1 and p1 ∈ (l,l+δqB(h−l)],
Dθ1 ∪D0
θ1 ( D(B,l) for all θ1 6= (B,l). All the combinations (θ1,a1 = 0) with θ1 6= (B,l) are pruned
from the game. Given the seller’s belief is restricted on type (B,l) after rejection, x(p1,0) = 1 and
it is contradictory to x(p1,1) > x(p1,0). So the equilibrium fails to pass criterion D1.
Part 2: Suppose all buyer types accept p1 ≤ l. From Part 1, Dθ1 = {φ : φ > x(p1,1) +
v1−p1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]} and D0
θ1 = {φ : φ = x(p1,1) +
v1−p1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]}.
If p1 = l and α < γ∗, Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for θ1 ∈ {(B,h),(G,h)} and Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = {1} for
θ1 ∈ {(B,l),(G,l)}.
25If p1 = l and α > γ∗, Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for θ1 ∈ {(B,h),(G,h)} and Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = [0,1] for
θ1 ∈ {(B,l),(G,l)}.
If p1 < l and α < γ∗, then Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for all buyer types θ1.
If p1 < l and α > γ∗, then either Dθ1∪D0
θ1 = ∅ for all buyer types θ1 or Dθ1∪D0
θ1 ( D(G,l). If the
latter happens, the seller’s belief is restricted on type (G,l) after rejection and she oﬀers x(p1,0) = 0.
It is still sequential rational for all buyer types θ1 to accept p1 < l given x(p1,1) = x(p1,0) = 0.
In all the cases above, the equilibrium passes criterion D1.
Part 3: Suppose all buyer types reject p1 < h. Then x(p1,0) > x(p1,1) and x(p1,0) = 1 without
considering the knife-edge case that α = γ∗. Since max{x(p1,0)−x(p1,1)} = 1 and all types reject
p1, p1 ≥ max
(d,v1)
{v1 − δqd(h − l)} = h − δqB(h − l) by the deﬁnition of cutoﬀ value.
Apply the deﬁnition of criterion D1 in the case that a1 = 1 is the out-of-equilibrium message.
So Dθ1 = {φ : φ > x(p1,0) +
p1−v1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]} and D0
θ1 = {φ : φ = x(p1,0) +
p1−v1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]}.
Then for x(p1,0) = 1 and p1 ∈ [h − δqB(h − l),h), Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 ( D(B,h) for all θ1 6= (B,h). All the
combinations (θ1,a1 = 1) with θ1 6= (B,h) are pruned from the game. Given the seller’s belief is
restricted on type (B,h) after acceptance, x(p1,1) = 1 and it is contradictory to x(p1,0) > x(p1,1).
So the equilibrium fails to pass Criterion D1.
Part 4: Suppose all buyer types reject p1 ≥ h. From Part 3, Dθ1 = {φ : φ > x(p1,0) +
p1−v1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]} and D0
θ1 = {φ : φ = x(p1,0) +
p1−v1
δqd(h−l),φ ∈ [0,1]}.
If p1 = h and α < γ∗, Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for θ1 ∈ {(B,l),(G,l)} and Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = {1} for
θ1 ∈ {(B,h),(G,h)}.
If p1 = h and α > γ∗, Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for θ1 ∈ {(B,l),(G,l)} and Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = [0,1] for
θ1 ∈ {(B,h),(G,h)}.
If p1 > h and α < γ∗, then Dθ1 ∪ D0
θ1 = ∅ for all buyer types θ1.
If p1 > h and α > γ∗, then either Dθ1∪D0
θ1 = ∅ for all buyer types θ1 or Dθ1∪D0
θ1 ( D(G,h). If the
latter case happens, the seller’s belief is restricted on type (G,h) after acceptance and x(p1,1) = 0.
Then it is still sequential rational for all buyer types θ1 to reject p1 > h given x(p1,1) = x(p1,0) = 0.
In all the cases above, the equilibrium passes criterion D1.
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